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VABSTRACT
The role of agriculture in saving or earning foreign exchange 
is usually very important for a developing open economy. How important 
it is for any particular country depends on the extent of agricultural 
comparative advantage enjoyed by that country, which changes as its 
economy develops.
The main purpose of this study is to trace the locus of 
comparative advantage of rice and barley production in Korea through the 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) analysis. Secondary data from the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea are used for this 
purpose.
The data on foodgrain production and trade and the protection 
and DRC estimates for the period 1964 to 1980 reveal that Korea's rice 
and barley industries have become both increasingly less competitive 
and increasingly inefficient in saving foreign exchange. The production 
and trade data show that self-sufficiency in foodgrains has declined 
from close to 100 per cent in the mid 1960s to less than 70 per cent in 
the late 1970s, despite the fact that prices received by Korean cereal 
producers have risen from about equal to world prices in the mid 1960s 
to more than three times world prices in the late 1970s.
Over this period the domestic resource cost ratios for rice and 
barley have increased from slightly less than unity to three or more, 
indicating that on average for each unit of foreign exchange saved by 
producing rice and barley domestically rather than importing it, 
the Korean economy foregoes about three units of foreign exchange
vi
by not being able to use those resources in more productive 
activities.
The thesis concludes that policies aimed at facilitating 
structural adjustment would be far more appropriate for Korea, given 
its rapid decline in agricultural comparative advantage, than 
policies aimed at ever increasing protection from import competition.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Korea, or South Korea (hereafter simply Korea), 
has a land area of 100,000 sq km and had a population of 38 million in 
1980. It is thus, like its neighbour and former colonizer Japan, 
extremely densely populated by World standards. In addition, it is a 
rugged mountainous country and only 22 per cent of its land surface is 
arable. It has a continental climate with dry, cold winters and hot, 
humid summers.
Prior to independence from Japan in 1945, most Koreans were 
farmers working on tiny plots of land and paying a large share of the 
harvest to their landlords. The unsettled political situation after 
independence led to the Korean War (1950-53), during and following which 
the Korean economy was in chaos. Agricultural growth was slow during 
this period because of heavy farm taxation and artificially low producer 
prices which were in part made possible by US shipments of certain 
agricultural products under PL480 and other US grants-in-aid.
The limited arable land area has been a major constraint on 
expanding agricultural production in Korea. Of the total cultivated 
area, about 60 per cent is paddy land. The government has attempted to 
expand the paddy area by developing tideland in the Western coastal 
region, but because of the high cost of construction only 44,000 ha had 
been developed by 1980 (a 3 per cent addition to the total paddy area). 
Substantial new development of the paddy area is unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
2Industrial development was also slow in the first decade 
following the Korean War, mainly because of inward-looking policies for 
manufacturing. Since the announcement of the First Five Year Development 
Plan (1962-66) and the opening up of the economy in 1964, however, 
industrial growth has been extremely rapid. An outward-looking, export- 
oriented industrial policy was pursued through the Second (1967-71),
Third (1972-76), and Fourth (1977-81) Five Year Plans, and continued to 
be pursued. The remarkable results of this strategy are well known: in
the 16 years to 1979, the economy maintained a real annual growth in GNP 
of 10 per cent, increased its manufacturing value added at twice that 
rate and expanded its exports at two and a half times that rate. During 
the period 1963-73 Korea enjoyed an annual growth rate in exports of 
34 per cent, the highest in the World. Its share of commodity exports 
in GNP expanded from only 2 per cent in the early 1960s to 50 per cent in 
1980, despite the fact that real GNP increased five-fold over that period.
An extremely rapid structural transformation of the economy has 
accompanied this growth. The share of agriculture in GNP has more than 
halved since 1963 and was around 16 per cent in 1980, while the 
manufacturing sector has more than trebled its share of GNP to 35 per 
cent in that time (Table 1.1). This structural transformation has been 
reflected in the trade composition and labour force distribution. In 
1958 about 17 per cent of exports were unprocessed agricultural goods and 
34 per cent were manufactures, while in the late 1970s manufacturing 
contributed 90 per cent of exports and agriculture only 4 per cent. 
Agriculture's share of the labour force has halved since 1963, falling to 
31 per cent in 1980. The number of workers in agriculture has been 
declining since 1977, and the rate of outmigration of farm workers to jobs 
in industry has been accelerating, averaging over 7 per cent of all farm
TABLE 1.1
MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1958 TO 1980 
(1975 PRICES)
1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1980
GNP ($US Million) 2,711 5,723 10,735 17,487 28,672 35,031
Population (million) 23,6 27.3 30.8 34.1 37.0 38.1
GNP Per Capita ($US) 115 247 348 513 776 917
Share of GNP (%):
Agriculturea 48 44 34 26 19 16
Manufacturing 8 10 15 24 32 35
Services 42 43 48 47 46 49
Share of Labour Force (%):
Agriculture3 na 61 50 47 37 32
Manuf ac turing na 8 13 16 22 22
Services na 28 34 34 38 43
Exports/GNP (%) 1 5 15 31 36 50
Imports/GNP (%) 11 16 26 35 40 64
Agric.a Share of Exports (%) 17 13 4 3 4 na
Manuf. Share of Exports (%) 34 52 77 88 90 na
Av. Annual Real Growthi (%): 1954-1963 1963-1979
GNP 4.2 9.7
GNP per Capita 1.1 7.8
Agric.a Value Added 2.5 5.0
Agric. Wages - 24.9
Manuf. Value Added 11.3 19.7
Exports 13.0 24.7
Imports 7.3 17.4
Note: a Agriculture includes forestry; fishing and mining are not showi
Source: Anderson, K. and Joo, Y.J., 1982. South Korea's Rapid
Industrialisation and its Implications for Agricultural Trade, 
in Adams, M. (ed), Economic Development and Change in East and 
Southeast Asia; Implications for Australia's Agricultural Trade 
in the 1980s, Australian Government Publishing Service for the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Canberra.
Bank of Korea, 1981. Economic Statistics Yearbook.
4workers per year during the late 1970s (Kim, Y.S., et al, 1980).
Accompanying these changes has been a rapid increase in food import 
dependence. Self sufficiency in food grains was close to 100 per cent 
in the 1950s, but was less than 70 per cent in the late 1970s.
Despite this very rapid rate of structural adjustment away from 
agriculture, concern has been expressed in Korea that farm incomes would 
not be able to keep up with rapidly growing urban incomes without 
government assistance to farmers. In addition, it has been feared that 
food security would be threatened by the increasing dependence on imported 
food and that social and political stability would be at risk if the rates 
of agricultural decline and urbanization continued to accelerate. These 
concerns have manifested themselves in rapid increases in protection from 
agricultural imports and price supports for grains since the late 1960s 
(Anderson, 1981).
The objective of this study is to evaluate the extent to which 
these rural assistance policies have added to the domestic resource cost 
of saving foreign exchange since the mid 1960s through encouraging rice 
and barley production in Korea. This, in combination with actual changes 
in food grain production and trade, will provide a better indication of 
the rate of increase in agricultural comparative disadvantage in Korea 
than is possible by looking at actual production and trade changes alone. 
These results will be used to assess the efficacy of existing policy 
trends for meeting the stated objectives of Korea's food and agricultural 
policy. The study covers the period from 1964, when Korea's foreign 
trade and payments regime was liberalised, to the most recent year for 
which data are available, 1980. The reason for concentrating on rice 
and barley is that they are by far the most important items in farm incomes 
and in food consumption in Korea.
5The study goes beyond previous analyses in a number of ways. 
First, it builds an available estimates of nominal rates of protection 
for rice and barley in Korea (Anderson, 1981) by calculating effective 
rates of protection as well as domestic resource cost ratios for each 
year from 1964 to 1980, and for five different farm size groups. Second, 
it adds to available studies of domestic resource costs of rice production 
in the Philippine, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States (Food Research 
Institute Studies, 1976). The present study is less limited than the 
earlier ones, however, in that the latter provide estimates only for 
1974. And third, the present analysis provides a case study of a country 
switching from providing negative to positive inducements to agriculture 
relative to manufacturing in its course of rapid growth. It will 
therefore be useful as an imput to future studies of the reasons why many 
countries tend to switch from taxing to subsidizing agriculture in the 
course of economic development (Bale and Lutz, 1981).
6CHAPTER 2
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CHANGING AGRICULTURAL 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
2.1 The Changing Role of Agriculture in Economic Development; Theory
The customary approach to the role of agriculture in economic 
development is formulated in terms of the "contributions" the 
agricultural sector can make or the "functions" it can perform during 
the process of economic development. Johnston and Meller (1961) argue 
that agricultural development can promote economic development in 
underdeveloped countries in five distinct ways: (i) by increasing the
supply of food and fibre available for domestic consumption; (ii) by 
enlarging the size of the domestic market for the manufacturing sector; 
(iii) by releasing labour needed for industrial expansion; (iv) by 
supplying investment funds for development; and (v) by providing the 
foreign exchange earned by agricultural exports or saved by reducing the 
need to import food.
In a closed economy, the agricultural sector serves the obvious 
and vital function of supplying domestic food requirements. But in an 
open economy, as Myint (1975) argues, it is no longer obvious why even an 
under-developed country with a dense population and scarce land should 
try to reach self sufficiency in food. If the country has a comparative 
advantage in nonfood agricultural or other products, it could more 
efficiently feed its population by exporting these products and importing 
food.
In a two-sector closed economy, a rise in productivity, spending 
power and savings of the agricultural sector is necessary before
7industrialization can begin. But in a small open economy this is no 
longer necessary, because export markets for manufactures remove the 
constraint on demand for industrial output and foreign capital inflow 
possibilities remove the constraint on manufacturing supply capacity, 
so long as labour is prepared to move from farms to industrial jobs 
(Tolley, 1975).
On the other hand, the low income elasticity of demand for 
food products ensures that the agricultural sector of a closed economy 
will decline as productivity and income rise in the country. However, 
in an open economy the amount of resources that can be profitably 
employed in the agricultural sector is no longer limited by the domestic 
demand for food. Thus it is clear that a better model than the above 
is needed to determine how a country’s agricultural sector will change 
in the course of economic development.
The modern version of comparative advantage theory is 
essentially an application of static general equilibrium theory. The 
optimal pattern of production and trade for a country is determined from 
a comparison of the opportunity cost of producing a given commodity with 
the price at which the commodity can be imported or exported. In 
equilibrium no commodity is produced which could be imported at lower 
cost, including the cost of overcoming natural or government barriers to 
imports. On the other hand exports are expanded until marginal cost 
equals the export price, net of export taxes or subsidies. Under the 
assumptions of full employment and perfect competition, the opportunity 
cost of a commodity, which is the value of the factors used to produce 
it in their best alternative employment, is equal to its market value. 
Market prices of factors and commodities can, therefore, be used to 
determine comparative advantage under competitive conditions. Long
8term changes are not ignored, but they are assumed to be reflected in 
current market prices.
The Heckscher-Ohlin version of the comparative advantage theory
has been widely recommended as a basis for development policy. This
version states that a country will benefit from trade by producing
commodities that use more of its relatively abundant factors of
production. It will export these commodities and import commodities
using more of the relatively scarce factors unless its pattern of domestic
demand happens to be biased toward commodities using domestic factors.
However, in the case of agriculture, it is necessary to include land as
the third factor of production. For this purpose, even Jones' (1971)
three-factor model is not ideal since it assumes each sector uses only
two factors, one specific to each sector and one common to the two sectors.
Anderson (1980) develops a more satisfactory model from the one
formalised by Jones (1971) which involves three factors of production:
agricultural land, capital and labour. His three factor general
equilibrium model is based on the following premises:
"An underdeveloped country with little capital will 
have a wage rate determined predominantly by its 
per worker agricultural land endowment, and will 
export agricultural products in exchange for 
manufactures. As incomes grow and capital is 
accumulated, labour will be attracted to the 
manufacturing sector which will expand relative 
to the agricultural sector. For any given rate of 
capital accumulation per worker, the speed of the 
reallocation of labour towards manufacturing will be 
greater the lower is the initial wage rate, that is, 
the smaller is the agricultural land endowment per 
worker. Over time, as the per worker endowment of 
capital increases, the comparative advantage within 
the manufacturing sector will shift towards more 
capital-intensive activities. A lightly populated 
country with a relatively high initial wage rate, by 
contrast, will switch much more slowly towards 
specialisation in manufacturing, absorbing its 
accumulation of capital in the development of a more 
limited range of relatively capital-intensive 
manufactures. (Anderson, 1981, p.14)"
9A number of points emerge from this theory. First, at a point 
in time, a country's comparative advantage in agriculture will be less 
the lower its endowment of agricultural land relative to mineral 
resources and nonfarm capital, compared with that in other countries; 
second, resource-poor, newly industrialising countries like Korea will 
have a faster rate of growth of food imports the faster their industrial 
growth; third, resource-rich countries, including those with high per 
capita incomes, will strengthen their comparative advantage in primary 
products through periods when their industrial activity and incomes are 
growing less rapidly than in other, especially resource-poor countries; 
fourth, the extent to which these tendencies are reflected in trade flows 
depends on the nature of the trade resistances. The validity of this 
theory is well supported by the empirical evidence from pacific aim 
countries, including Korea (Anderson, 1980).
On the other hand, in all countries agriculture's share of 
national production and employment are likely to continue to decline as 
incomes rise because of the required expansion of the service sector.
These declines will be more marked in the newly-industrialising countries, 
like Korea, where the relative importance of the manufacturing sector is 
still expanding. Moreover, if the increasing role of foreign industrial 
capital in developing countries is taken into account, the decline of 
agriculture's share of national production and employment will be even 
faster.
2.2 The Changing Role of Agriculture in Korean Economic Development
Agriculture's role in rapidly growing Korea is changing in a 
number of ways and at a rapid pace. In response to rapid industrialisation, 
agriculture's share in gross national product (GNP) has been declining 
dramatically. Until the early 1960s, this decline had been slow.
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However, when industrialisation and export promotion took off after 1964, 
the share of agriculture declined from 47 per cent in 1964 to 17 per cent 
by 1980. According to Ban (1980), of a total increase in GNP of 2,665 
billion won between 1964 and 1975 (in constant 1970 prices), agriculture 
contributed only 285 billion won or just over 10 per cent. However, it 
is important to understand that agriculture's small and declining 
contribution did not result from an unusually slow growth rate of 
agriculture. In fact Korea's agricultural performance during the past 
two decades was well above the World average and comparable to the overall 
Asian average. The decline of agriculture's share was due to a relatively 
much more rapid increase of both manufacturing and service sectors. 
Manufacturing plus public utilities, construction, and transport, which 
together accounted for only 24 per cent of GNP in 1964, experienced a 
sixfold increase over the next eleven years. The 1840 billion won 
increase in value added ip these sectors (1970 prices) accounted for 
nearly 70 per cent of the increase in GNP. The remaining 20 per cent 
of the 1964-75 rise came mainly from the service sector, particularly 
commerce which grew largely in order to handle the increased volume of 
manufactures.
There have been massive transfers of workers out of agriculture 
into other occupations. Sloboda (1980) has estimated the volume and
annual rate of net off-farm migration during 1960-70 in Korea by the 
forward census survival method. According to that estimation, the 
annual net out-migration from farm households rose from an average of 
243,000 persons per year during 1960-66 to 569,000 persons per year 
during 1966-70. Net off-farm migration among the working-age population 
between 15 and 60 years old averaged 170,000 persons per year during the 
first half of the 1960s and 372,000 persons per year during the second
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half of that decade. The rate of out-migration of labour from farms 
has been accelerating through the 1970s. Kim, Y.S., et al, (1980) 
reports that the average annual rates of out-migration of the labour 
force from agriculture increased gradually by 1.5, 2.9, 4.5, 5.2, and 
7.4 per cent through 1964-66, 1967-69, 1970-72, 1973-76, and 1977-79. 
Ultimately this increasing trend of out-migration resulted in an 
absolute decrease of the farm labour force since 1977. More importantly, 
these migrants came disproportionately from the more educated portions 
of the rural population. Thus the agricultural sector has contributed 
to economic development by supplying educated workers for other sectors.
Accurate savings estimates are notoriously difficult to obtain. 
The inaccuracy is largely due to the fact that savings are usually taken 
to be equal to the residual after all sources of income and expenditure 
have been totalled. With this qualification in mind, available 
statistics are assembled in Table 2.1. Throughout the past two decades, 
rural savings financed an average share far less than the contribution 
of agriculture to GNP.
TABLE 2.1
AGRICULTURE’S SHARE IN POPULATION,
GNP, AND GROSS DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION (GDCF)
Farm
Population
(%)
Share in GNP 
in Current 
Prices 
<%)
GDCF as 
% of GNP 
(Current 
Prices)
Farm Household Savings
as % of 
GNP
as % of 
GDCF
1963-67 55 38 18 4 22
1968-72 47 27 26 5 21
1973-77 38 24 28 6 22
1978 31 22 31 5 15
1979 29 21 35 3 10
Source: Bank of Korea, 1980. Economic Statistics Yearbook.
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The declining trend of agriculture’s contribution to earning 
or saving foreign exchange is reflected in the changes in agricultural 
trade and food self sufficiency (Table 2.2). Supplementing the shortage 
of domestic production has been the main purpose of imports in Korea as 
far as foodgrains are concerned. This fact is well reflected in the 
fluctuation of rice and barley imports in line with year by year 
fluctuations in domestic production. However, the quantities of wheat, 
maize, and soy bean imports have increased continuously during the 1970s 
at average annual rates of 3, 26, and 33 per cent, respectively. These 
three items account for most of the increase in agricultural imports in 
Korea. Korea continues to strive for self sufficiency of rice and barley 
but has allowed wheat and maize self sufficiency to fall to almost zero 
and soy bean import dependence to increase rapidly, 65 per cent in 1980 
compared with close to zero in the mid 1970s. The increase of import 
dependency resulted in an agricultural imports bill in 1980 of US$5,508 
million or a quarter of the total imports payments that year (Table 2.3). 
In the meantime, the ratio of agricultural exports to total exports 
decreased from around 40 per cent in 1964 to below 10 per cent by 1980.
The last column of Table 2.3 provides a crude index of foreign 
capital inflow. It shows that Korea's imports net of exports have 
averaged more than 10 per cent of GNP since 1960, which compares with 
about 2 per cent for developing countries as a whole. That is, Korea 
has been exceptionally open to foreign capital.
Such developments in Korea's agricultural production and trade 
can be explained largely by the theory of changing comparative advantage. 
With its dense population and openness to inflows of foreign capital for 
export oriented industrialization, Korea has specialised in labour 
intensive manufacture which has been the basis of Korea's economic growth.
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TABLE 2.2
GRAIN AND SOY BEAN PRODUCTION, IMPORTS 
CONSUMPTION AND SELF SUFFICIENCY, 
1955 TO 1980a
('000 tonnes and per cent)
(a) Rice and Barley
Polished Rice Polished Barley
Product­
ion
Net
Imports
Consum­
ption
Self
Suffici- 
ency(%)
Product­
ion
Net Consum- Self
Imports ption Suffici­
ency (%)
1955 2700 0 2700 100 842 15 857(80) 98
1956 2.959 4 2953 100 887 154 1010(96) 88
1957 2438 202 2640 92 769 186 921(65) 84
1958 3002 23 3019 99 958 206 1251(57) 77
1959 3161 - 1 3154 100 1098 20 979(71) 112
1960 3150 -24 3126 101 1110 0 1007(81) 110
1961 3047 - 6 3092 99 1197 121 1230(81) 90
1962 3463 -62 3407 102 1113 30 1235(123) 90
1963 3015 112 3136 96 746 170 1166(116) 64
1964 3758 -14 3709 101 1227 151 1017(102) 121
1965 3954 - 1 3925 101 1459 71 1377(138) 106
1966 3501 -31 3532 99 1932 0 1488(149) 110
1967 3919 113 3954 99 1550 0 1717(165) 90
1968 3603 216 3822 94 1680 106 1702(168) 99
1969 3195 755 3946 81 1666 67 1742(161) 96
1970 4090 541 4394 93 1591 0 1497(115) 106
1971 3939 907 4747 83 1510 0 1644(155) 92
1972 3997 584 4362 92 1600 254 1717(120) 93
1973 3937 437 4296 92 1443 350 1740(68) 83
1974 4212 206 4641 91 1388 299 1771(74) 78
1975 4445 481 4699 95 1700 354 1848(83) 92
1976 4669 168 4644 100 1759 0 1796(81) 98
1977 5215 0 5045 103 814 322 1523(76) 53
1978 6066 -80 5784 104 1348 0 1125(71) 120
1979 5797 502 6738 86 1508 0 1289(76) 117
1980p 5563 580 6230 89 811 0 1369( ) 59
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TABLE 2.2 (C o n t 'd )  
(b) Wheat and Corn
Wheat Com
P r o d u c t -  Net Consum- S e l f  P r o d u c t -  Net Consum- S e l f
io n  Im p o r ts  p t i o n  S u f f i c i -  io n  Im p o r ts  p t i o n  S u f f i c i ­
ency (%) ency(%)
1955 113 53 166(17) 68 13 0 13(5) 100
1956 123 221 343(17) 36 13 0 13(5 ) 100
1957 134 417 529(18) 25 11 36 47(5 ) 23
1958 133 495 620(18) 22 14 93 107(38) 13
1959 137 188 356(18) 39 14 27 41(7) 34
1960 164 390 484(19) 34 14 60 74(46) 19
1961 159 354 399(19) 40 14 56 70(45) 20
1962 164 398 593(19) 28 16 36 52 (26 ) 32
1963 139 815 978(19) 14 18 89 107(39) 17
1964 190 607 777(19) 25 20 64 84(40) 24
1965 184 496 682(20) 27 35 62 97(52) 36
1966 193 460 651(20) 30 40 33 73(35) 55
1967 191 909 991(20) 19 34 49 77(45) 44
1968 211 1026 1340(38) 16 60 131 158(110) 38
1969 224 1369 1479(42) 15 63 174 244(174) 26
1970 219 1254 1421(45) 15 63 284 341(257) 18
1971 196 1384 1656(46) 12 68 315 365(282) 19
1972 149 1778 2033(43) 7 64 422 468(371) 14
1973 100 1772 1896(37) 5 54 456 437(326) 12
1974 74 1427 1499(22) 5 61 573 594(414) 10
1975 97 1588 1708(29) 6 58 532 697(471) 8
1976 82 1857 1818(20) 5 60 890 894(619) 7
1977 45 1979 1981(22) 2 84 1370 1353(1016) 6
1978 36 1589 1693(20) 2 113 1791 1918(1508) 6
1979 42 1652 1741(20) 2 100 2881 2914(2451) 3
1980 92 1810 1990( ) 5 149 2234 2517( ) 6
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TABLE 2 .2  (C o n t 'd )
(c) A l l  f o u r  g r a i n s  and soy  bean
A l l  Four G ra in s  ( p o l i s h e d  b a s i s ) Soy Bean
P ro d u c -  N et Consum- S e l f  P ro d u c -  Net Consum- S e l f
t i o n  Im p o r ts  p t i o n  S u f f i c i e n c y  t i o n  Im p o r ts  p t i o n  S u f f i c i -
(%)______  ency(%)
T o t a l  Food 
Only
1955 3636 69 3705(96) 98 101 150 9 159(45) 94
1956 3947 326 4232(112) 93 96 149 42 191(45) 78
1957 3325 727 3992(82) 83 85 153 33 186(45) 82
1958 4070 662 4806(94) 85 86 153 65 218(59) 70
1959 4372 178 4429(89) 99 101 153 29 182(25) 84
1960 4394 309 4546(124) 97 99 138 36 174(25) 79
1961 4281 342 4662(124) 92 94 130 22 148(16) 88
1962 4711 292 5124(153) 92 95 165 16 185(31) 89
1963 3878 956 5111(154) 76 78 156 10 166(19) 94
1964 5141 637 5368(140) 96 98 156 9 165(18) 95
1965 5574 485 5879(185) 95 98 163 0 163(13) 100
1966 5304 339 5559(186) 95 99 174 0 174(12) 100
1967 5635 834 6135(208) 92 90 161 29 185(18) 87
1968 5480 1182 6639(264) 83 86 201 17 223(16) 90
1969 5069 1969 6961(299) 73 76 245 24 262(16) 94
1970 5885 1667 7179(306) 82 86 229 36 266(18) 86
1971 5609 2151 7872(362) 71 75 232 61 281(27) 83
1972 5748 2447 7910(379) 73 76 222 71 293(24) 76
1973 5509 2412 7744(295) 71 74 224 73 298(34) 75
1974 5693 1939 7914(343) 72 75 246 66 291(32) 85
1975 6254 2366 8270(392) 76 79 319 61 372(46) 86
1976 6527 2122 8396(474) 78 83 311 119 420(91) 74
1977 6114 2662 8899(712) 69 75 295 151 437(119) 68
1978 7450 2220 9366(1006) 80 89 319 223 538(173) 59
1979 7391 3515 11121(1585) 66 78 293 422 675(291) 43
1980p 6535 3318 10649( ) 61 257 417 731( ) 35
TABLE 2.2 (Cont'd)
Notes: a Data are for rice years ending October 31. Imports are
expressed net of exports. Apparent consumption data are 
derived from production plus net imports minus the change 
in stocks. Consumption data in round parentheses are the 
amounts consumed by livestock. Self-sufficiency ratios, 
expressed in percentage terms, are the shares of apparent 
consumption produced domestically . To obtain the aggregate 
data in Table 2.2(C) all four grains are converted to a 
polished basis, using the following weight reduction 
conversion factors to adjust data expressed on an hulled 
basis: wheat .76 and corn .61. The food self-sufficiency
ratio for all four grains in Table 2.2(C) is the ratio of 
production to apparent food consumption (net of feed use).
The production data, especially for rice, are only estimates 
and should be treated with caution. Unofficial estimates 
for 1979 place rice production and apparent consumption about 
500 tonnes lower than the official estimates shown above, for 
example.
p Preliminary.
Source: Anderson, K., 1981. Northeast Asian Agricultural Protection
in Historical and Comparative Perspective: The Case of South
Korea, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Research Paper No.82, 
A.N.U.
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However, the rapid development of local skills, managerial experience
and technological know-how, is causing Korea's comparative advantage in
manufacturing to both strengthen and broaden into more capital-intensive
and skill-intensive industries. In the course of these changes the
volume of agricultural imports has increased continuously along with the
decline in agricultural comparative advantage in Korea. Furthermore,
rapid urbanization and increased rural-urban migration have caused a
shortage of labour in rural areas and ultimately a sharp increase in
real agricultural wages. While the substitution of mechanical power
for labour and the development of new, higher-yielding rice varieties
have helped to offset this decline in agricultural comparative advantage
to some extent, the much faster rates of productivity growth in and
capital accumulation and inflow for the manufacturing sector have ensured
that the relative decline of agriculture continues.
Ban (1980) summarises the trends of Korean agricultural output:
"Since 1954, Korean agriculture has entered a steady 
and sustained long-run growth path. Total 
agricultural production, output and gross value 
added in agriculture grew at an annual rate of 
3.48 per cent, 3.19 per cent, and 2.83 per cent, 
respectively, from 1954 to 1973. The annual 
growth rate of total agricultural output was 
accelerating from 2.54 per cent between 1954 and 
1960 to 5.55 per cent between 1960 and 1965.
The rate of growth has been decelerating since 
1965 from an annual growth rate of 2.84 per cent 
between 1965 and 1970 to 1.21 per cent between
1970 and 1973 ....  Agricultural output grew at
an annual rate of 8.81 per cent during the period 
from 1973 to 1977 (Ban, 1981, p.4)M.
According to him total agricultural output increased 1.8 times 
by 1980 compared with that of 1964 while total agricultural input by only 
1.1 times during the same period.
The next chapter provides details of changes within the 
agricultural sector over the past two decades or so, both in the commodity
19
composition of output and in the input mix and productivity of inputs. 
It then discusses changes in policies affecting incentives faced by 
farmers, before turning to analyse the extent of protection provided to 
agriculture to reduce the rate of farm adjustment to its declining 
comparative advantage.
20
CHAPTER 3
ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN KOREA'S 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
3.1 Farm Output Changes
Despite the rapid growth of agricultural output there has been 
little change in the importance of rice in the Korean rural economy over 
the past two or three decades. Since rice is historically the most 
important single commodity in Korea, the Korean economy is often referred 
to as a rice economy and the term rice policy is used as a synonym for 
food policy. As shown in Table 3.1 the contribution of rice to farm 
income has remained unchanged. Rice is the major determinant of farm 
income because of its dominance in production. On average more than 
half of agricultural receipts are still due to rice cultivation.^
Traditionally barley has been the second most important food 
crop for Korea in terms of quantity consumed. However, since it is 
considered as an inferior food to rice its annual consumption per head 
has shown a decreasing trend as income has grown. Its importance as the 
second most important foodgrain consumed was transferred to wheat after 
1977. The contribution of barley to gross farm income averaged 13 
per cent in the 1960s but it had decreased to 5 per cent by 1980.
In the 1970s, the importance to the farm sector of fruit and 
vegetables and livestock products increased rapidly. This is reflected 
both in the share of gross receipts from these products (Table 3.1) and
1 It fell below 50 per cent for the first time in 1980, due to a bad 
harvest.
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TABLE 3.1
COMPOSITION OF FARM INCOME AND 
AGRICULTURAL GROSS RECEIPTS
Year Farm Income(%)
Agricultural Gross Receipts at 
Current Domestic Prices(%)
Total Agri.
Income
Off-Farm
Income
Total Rice Barley
Wheat
Other
Grains
Veges. 
Fruits 
Special 
Crops
Livestock Others3
1965 100.0 79 21 100.0 57.0 14.9 9.0 4.7 14.4
1966 100.0 78 22 100.0 53.0 14.3 8.0 5.5 19.2
1967 100.0 78 22 100.0 51.8 14.1 9.0 5.4 19.7
1968 100.0 76 24 100.0 57.1 13.9 9.0 6.3 13.7
1969 100.0 77 23 100.0 59.5 11.4 10.0 5.9 13.2
1970 100.0 76 24 100.0 55.6 11.3 13.2 5.8 14.0
1971 100.0 82 18 100.0 59.1 10.7 12.2 5.7 12.3
1972 100.0 82 18 100.0 58.0 10.4 12.6 6.7 12.3
1973 100.0 81 19 100.0 56.4 9.3 13.1 6.7 14.4
1974 100.0 80 20 100.0 59.4 8.5 12.5 6.2 13.3
1975 100.0 82 18 100.0 54.8 10.6 13.9 7.4 13.3
1976 100.0 80 20 100.0 56.2 8.9 14.7 10.1 10.1
1977 100.0 72 28 100.0 58.1 3.2 17.6 13.3 7.8
1978 100.0 72 28 100.0 51.5 6.6 20.1 14.5 7.3
1979 100.0 69 31 100.0 57.0 7.6 20.8 7.6 7.0
1980 100.0 65 35 100.0 48.7 5.8 25.7 12.1 7.7
Note: a Includes receipts from potatoes, pulses, sericulture
handicrafts, and by-products.
Source: Korea Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1981. Report
on the Results of Farm Household Economy Survey.
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in the number of farm households producing them (Table 3.2). These 
increases are the result of adjustments of Korean agriculture to changes 
in domestic food consumption patterns, involving the transfer of resources 
from the production of farm products with low income elasticities to 
those with high income elasticities.
Another aspect of changes in Korean agriculture is the increase 
in the proportion of off-farm income in farm households' total income: 
it had fluctuated around 20 per cent up to the mid 1970s, but since then 
it has increased rapidly and reached 35 per cent by 1980 (Table 3.1).
3.2 Farm Input Changes
The proportion of farm population to the whole population
decreased from 58 per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 1980 and since 1968
even the absolute number of rural people has been decreasing. However,
the absolute number of economically active farm people has begun
decreasing only since 1977. During the 1970s the number of farm
households decreased annually by 1.4 per cent on average while the area
of cultivated land decreased by 0.5 per cent. The decline of area of
cultivated land is the net result of a continuous decrease of upland
after 1969, at an average annual rate of 1.2 per cent, and only a small
increase in paddy land, at an average annual rate of 0.7 per cent since
1973 (Table 3.2). This reflects the fact that land formerly cultivated
is increasingly being used in the process of urbanization for roads or
buildings. However, because the number of farm households and farm
workers have decreased more rapidly the area of cultivated land per farm
household has increased slightly, while acreage per farm worker increased
1 According to Anderson (1982) shares of gross value of agricultural 
production for livestock and fruit and vegetables have increased from 
14 per cent to 17 per cent and from 18 per cent to 26 per cent 
respectively, comparing the 1965-69 period with the 1975-79 period.
For cereals the share decreased from 46 per cent to 38 per cent during 
the same period.
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from 2.83 hectares in 1964 to 4.12 hectares by 1980.
For the change in land productivity two different trends are 
observable: it declined at an average annual rate of 2.7 per cent between 
1962 and 1968 but since 1969 it has increased at the rate of 6.9 per cent.
As shown in Table 3.3 labour input, estimated in terms of hour- 
equivalent units of labour actually used in farming, decreased consistently 
at an average annual rate of 4.4 per cent between 1962 and 1974, but 
since 1975 it has increased slightly. Labour intensity has decreased 
at an average annual rate of 3.5 per cent and this decrease has been 
accompanied by an increase of labour productivity at an average annual 
rate of 7.5 per cent during the 1962-78 period. This trend is as 
expected from theory, given the rapid rise in real wages relative to 
capital costs that has accompanied Korea’s industrial growth.
Fixed capital input is measured by the sum of depreciation 
charges on farm machinery and equipment, perennial fruit trees, and farm 
buildings plus the service value of draft animals and irrigation fees.
Ban (1981) shows it increased at an annual rate of 1.4 per cent during 
the 1946-77 period. Capital productivity fluctuated sharply during the 
mid 1960s but it remained constant in average terms after 1968 despite 
the increase of capital intensity at the annual rate of 7.2 per cent 
during the same period.
On the other hand, the growth rates of purchased intermediate 
inputs have been very high, averaging 5 per cent per year during the 
1960-65 period, 14 per cent during the 1965-70 and 10 per cent during 
the 1970-77 (Ban, 1981). This trend is likely to accelerate because of 
the need to increase land productivity and reduce labour intensity in 
line with the increasing relative prices of these factors. Increased 
foodgrain use in livestock production is an especially important case of 
increased purchased inputs.
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In short, Korea's agricultural production moved from a labour 
intensive to a more capital intensive pattern and its productivity 
growth became more labour saving and land saving by using purchased 
inputs more heavily.
In the meantime, the largest size group of farm households 
(larger than 2.0 ha) and the smallest size group (smaller than 0.5 ha) 
have decreased slightly in proportions. This decrease has been offset 
by increases in the share of farms in the non-crop farming group or the 
medium size groups (Table 3.4).
3.3 Changes in Agricultural Price and Trade Policies
The overall trend of Korea's agricultural price and trade policy 
can be summarised as having switched gradually from effectively taxing 
agriculture to heavily assisting it. The Korean government enacted the 
Grain Management Law in February 1950 and it remains today as the basic 
legislation for food grain policy. The main object of this law was to 
enable the government to secure sufficient grain from farmers so as to 
stabilize the national economy by exercising adequate control over grain 
distribution and consumption through manipulation of government stocks. 
Later in 1963 and 1967, the main provisions of the law were reaffirmed 
and additional authority was given to the government, but the basic 
direction remained the same. The Korean government has full legal 
authority for regulation. It has authority to import or export grain 
and can regulate grain purchase and sales. The market share of government 
rice in total marketing expanded to over 50 per cent during the 1970s.
The rice price mechanism is totally under government control. In the 
market for barley the government's involvement is even more complete: in
1975 it handled more than 90 per cent of the total quantity marketed.
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TABLE 3.4
DIVERSIFICATION OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS
Unit:%
Year Total No.
of Farm 
Household
Non Crop 
Farm
Less Than 
0.5 ha 0.5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1..5-2.0
More Than 
2.0 ha
1961 2,327,116 - 40.7 31.8 21.1 6.4
1962 2,469,453 - 41.0 32.5 20.5 6.0
1963 2,415,593 - 41.8 31.5 20.6 6.1
1964 2,450,308 - 39.9 31.9 21.5 6.7
1965 2,506,899 - 35.9 31.7 16.5 9.1 6.7
1966 2,540,274 - 35.2 32.2 17.1 8.7 6.7
1967 2,586,864 - 35.5 32.1 17.3 8.5 6.7
1968 2,578,526 2.2 33.3 31.8 17.6 8.4 6.7
1969 2,546,244 2.3 33.1 31.7 17.8 8.4 6.7
1970 2,483,318 2.9 31.6 33.2 18.0 7.8 6.5
1971 2,481,525 3.4 32.7 31.7 18.0 8.0 6.2
1972 2,451,844 3.5 32.7 31.7 18.0 7.9 6.2
1973 2,450,277 3.5 32.4 31.5 18.1 8.2 6.3
1974 2,381,200 4.7 28.3 34.0 18.2 8.2 6.6
1975 2,379,058 4.0 29.0 34.8 18.1 7.9 6.2
1976 2,335,856 4.5 29.4 34.9 17.8 7.5 5.9
1977 2,303,930 4.9 29.8 34.5 17.7 7.4 5.7
1978 2,223,807 3.8 28.4 35.9 18.5 7.7 5.7
1979 2,161,821 3.8 29.6 35.3 18.2 7.5 5.6
Source: Korea Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Yearbook of
Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, various years.
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Beginning in the early 1960s, the government expanded the scale 
of its grain operations through increased purchases from farmers and 
through directly controlling imports. In addition to the original 
function of supplying grain for institutional uses such as the army, the 
government began to put emphasis on seasonal price stabilization through 
direct sales in the market during the non-harvest seasons when prices 
normally would increase.
In the face of decreasing food grain self sufficiency, policy 
makers considered ways to expand domestic food grain supplies by 
supporting higher prices for producers. Starting with the 1968 crop, 
the government took the initiative to improve the terms of trade in 
favour of farm producers by raising the purchase price for rice and 
barley (Table 3.5). Since this change in food grain policy, the prices 
of food grains have been maintained above the level of prices at the 
country's border and increasingly so through the 1970s (Table 3.5).
These distortions of market prices have been a great burden to the 
national economy because in addition to protecting food grain producers 
from import competition, price supports have been provided by the Treasury 
which has financed the wedge between consumer and producer prices.
The current pattern of protection in Korea is unusual among 
developing countries in that it is biased in favour of the primary sector 
and against the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, the extent of 
discrimination between the two sectors has become substantially greater 
during the 1970s. However, Korea's agriculture in the first post-Korean 
war decade was doubly squeezed, by negative incentives for farm production 
and positive manufacturing incentives.
The trade liberalization of the mid 1960s reduced substantially 
the assistance to manufacturing. Frank, Kim and Westphal (1975)
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estimate that the effective rate of assistance to agriculture in 1968 
was 21 per cent, compared with~5 per cent for manufacturing (Table 3.6). 
During the 1970s, assistance to manufacturing increased, but to a much 
smaller extent than that to agriculture. Kim, et al (1976) and the 
Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (1978) report that the effective 
rates of protection in 1968 were 18.1 per cent for agriculture and -0.9 
per cent for manufacturing and they were reversed in 1975, 30 per cent 
for agriculture and 46 per cent for manufacturing. However, these 
results are not representative of trend because of the high food price 
in 1975. Nam (1980) estimates that the effective rates of assistance 
in 1978 were 69 per cent for agriculture compared with 7 per cent for 
manufacturing.
While there is a possibility that those studies under-estimated 
some forms of implicit assistance to export manufactures, it is also 
likely that, at least for 1978, most of them under-estimated agricultural 
protection.^ Nam, for example estimates the 1978 nominal protective 
coefficient for agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector to be 1.55 
whereas Anderson (1981) estimates this coefficient for grains and 
livestock to be 2.34 in that year. Nevertheless, those studies are 
enough to catch the real picture of growth of agricultural relative to 
manufacturing protection in Korea.
The growth of protection is especially conspicuous for rice 
and barley. Anderson (1981) provides the nominal protective coefficients 
(NPC) for rice and barley from 1955 to 1980. According to his 
estimation during the post-1964 period two different sub-periods are
1 For the more detailed discussion see Anderson, 1980. "Changing 
Agricultural Comparative Advantage in the Pacific Basin", Ch.2 in 
Australian Agriculture and Newly Industrializing Asia: Issues for
Research, (eds), Anderson, K. and George, A., A.N.U., Canberra.
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observable. Between 1964 and 1975 the average NPC for rice was 1.28 
but it was more than doubled during 1976-80 to 2.69. However, for 
barley the sharp increase of NPC happened one year later than rice hence 
until 1976 the NPC for barley remained around 1.14 on average but it 
also jumped to 2.19 during 1977-80. Given that not only the nominal 
protection rates are rising but so too is the share of purchased inputs 
in the value of output, it is of interest to know how much more rapidly 
effective protection has been rising. This is one of the concerns of 
the next two chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
APPROACHES TO MEASURING DIVERGENCES 
FROM EFFICIENT RESOURCE USE
4.1 Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection
A simple measure of the divergence between world market and 
domestic prices is the legal tariff. If foreign supply is perfectly 
elastic, and if imports are free from quantitative controls, and if 
domestic demand for a protected commodity is great enough to sustain 
imports despite the extra cost, then the legal tariff is both equal to 
and the cause of the divergence between world market and domestic prices. 
However, in cases where there exist direct or indirect distortions such 
as exemption from duties for a number of commodities and a number of 
prohibitive tariffs, the legal tariff overstates the actual degree of 
protection. On the other hand, if quantitative import controls also 
exist, it may understate the degree of protection.
Estimating the nominal rate of protection is thus a preferable 
measure to the tariff. The nominal rate of protection is defined as:
where Pk^ is the domestic price of commodity k and Pk^ is its border 
price. This is an estimate of the degree to which incentive policies 
affect domestic producer prices relative to those that would exist under 
a free trade regime. However, this still may not be a good measure of 
the degree of protection afforded to domestic producers if tradable input 
prices are also distorted.
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The effective rate of protection (ERP) approach has been 
developed to overcome this shortcoming of the nominal rate of protection 
approach. According to the proponents of this theory it is the 
protection to the value added that is important in determining resource 
allocation, not just the nominal tariff on the final good. The ERP can 
be derived in the following way:
V.J
V.'J
V.'J
E.J
1 - Ea ij
1 + t. - Ea..(1 + t.) J ij i
a  + r.) V.
= W aii 
Vj Vj
t. + J
(tl"t1)Eai1
(4.1)
(4.2)
(4.3)
(4.4)
where is the ERP of j industry;
ij
is the value added in the j industry; 
is the value of the input from the i ^  
industry into the j ^  industry; 
is the domestic value added in the 
industry;
this the nominal tariff in the j industry; 
and
E a ..t . ,
i j  i / ,
'ij
is the weighted average tariff 
rate on inputs of commodities 
into the j*"*1 industry.
From the equation it is clear that if t_. = t^ , 
tariff rate and the effective tariff rate are the same.
then the nominal 
It is also clear
that the smaller the value added share, the higher is the ERP above the 
nominal rate of protection on output, ceteris paribus. While the
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effective protection concept is a more complete indicator than NPC of the 
extent to which resources have been distorted away from producing 
according to comparative advantage, it is still only a partial equilibrium 
approach. The theory ignores the general equilibrium repercussions of 
distortive policies. It also does not capture distortions in factor 
prices (as distinct from purchased inputs). A preferable measure is 
provided by the domestic resource cost approach.
4.2 Domestic Resource Cost
Bruno (1972) defines the concept of the Domestic Resource Cost 
(DRC) as relating to "a measure of real opportunity cost in terms of 
total domestic resources of producing (or saving) a net marginal unit 
of foreign exchange". This indicates that domestic resources will be 
valued at accounting or shadow prices and that foreign exchange is 
treated as a scarce commodity. The DRC are calculated as the ratio 
between the cost of domestic resources evaluated at accounting prices 
and net foreign exchange earnings through value of traded output minus 
value of traded inputs.
Following Islam's (1980) criteria for determining whether any 
particular agricultural production is socially profitable or not, the 
DRC formulation can be written as follows:
kK + bL. + tT. + EA. 
.1 i 3 -1
P. - la..P. - EA.T J i] i J
<
> aR
where k is the shadow price of capital;
b is the shadow price of labour;
t is the shadow price of land;
a is the multiplier to convert the official
exchange rate into the shadow exchange rate;
(4.5)
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R is the official exchange rate;
P is the world price value of the output
or the input in the foreign currency at
the official exchange rate;
a is the material input coefficients of
producing the output;
K.L.T are the amount of capital, labour
and land inputs;
i is the subscript for input;
j is the subscript for output;
NT
j
j
is the direct and the indirect factor
use by the non-tradables used in the
production of j ^  commodity valued at
the shadow prices; and
is the direct and the indirect use of
the tradable inputs of the non-tradables 
thused in the j industry valued at the 
world price in the foreign currency at 
the official exchange rate.
Expression (4.5) can be rewritten as:
NTkK. + bL. 4- tT. + EA.3 3 1 I 1  1
(P. - Ea..P. - EA.T) aR J i] J J
(4.6)
The calculated result of DRC in this formulation gives the social
opportunity cost which is necessary to earn a net marginal unit of
thforeign exchange through the j industry. In other words, for optimal 
domestic resource allocation industry j should be expanded, remain as it 
is, or be contracted if DRCk is less than, equal to, or greater than one,
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The DRC approach is based on a set of basic assumptions such 
as (1) the world price of the output is given exogenously or estimable;
(2) incremental costs of production determined by a given technology 
and an assumed set of relative factor prices are constant, subject to 
sensitivity analysis to reflect changed assumptions; (3) elasticities 
of input substitution are zero; (4) shadow prices of inputs, outputs and 
foreign exchange, which are representative of the true opportunity costs 
of factors and of the true scarcity values of commodities and currency 
are calculable. Among those assumptions, (2) and (3) emphasise the 
static nature of the DRC concept and emphasise that comparisons of DRC 
coefficients over time can only be made if production cost data are 
available on a time series basis or if production technologies and growth 
patterns do not substantially alter input mixes and domestic factor cost. 
However, the most crucial assumption concerns the shadow prices for the 
major factors of production - land, labour, capital, and foreign exchange.
Shadow prices of factors of production in this study are 
defined in terms of the social opportunity costs of using the factor in 
its best alternative employment, while the shadow prices of tradable 
outputs and inputs are border prices. Another central element of the 
DRC technique is the division of non-tradable input costs into tradable 
input costs and primary domestic factor costs.
Bruno (1963) has carried out several innovative empirical 
analyses of the Israeli economy, incorporating growth aspects in a 
dynamic linear programming model in order to determine dynamic comparative 
advantage for sectors in that one country. In the absence of data 
required for a linear programming approach, sensitivity analysis can be 
undertaken on major variables in an effort to approximate the effects of 
dynamic changes. Variables which might usefully be subjected to
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sensitivity analysis include the world price of the commodity, the 
input-output coefficients to reflect different assumptions on changes 
in technology and/or in factor productivity, the shadow prices of domestic 
factors to allow for changing opportunity costs as factor supplies or 
policies are altered, the external effects, and the shadow price of 
foreign exchange which may result from changing comparative advantage 
of other domestic activities or of alterations in policies. By changing 
assumptions in this manner, it is possible to ascertain the sensitivity 
of the empirical results to particular assumptions.
As a result of considering the limitations related with 
nominal protection coefficients, the effective protection and DRC 
approaches are used in the next chapter to measure the changing degree 
of divergence of resources away from their most efficient uses. The 
estimation methodology is as follows.
4.3 Methodology for Estimating Effective Protection Coefficients and 
DRCs
The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries of Korea has published 
data on the costs of production for unhulled rice and barley by size of 
cultivated land annually since 1955. Costs are reported separately for 
all major items including seed, fertilizer, disease prevention, other 
materials, taxes, irrigation, agricultural implements, buildings, other 
charges, labour, capital and land.^" After some adjustments to the 
original data (discussed below), DRC coefficients are calculated for 
rice and barley for 5 different farm size groups, and their average, from 
1964 to 1980. Prior to the liberalization of the trade and payments 
regime in 1964, the Korean exchange rate was substantially overvalued,
1 For the definition of each item and method of evaluation, see Appendix.
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whereas since 1964 it has been close to its equilibrium value (Frank, 
Kim, Westphal, 1975). Thus by looking only at the period since 1964 
the difficult problem of estimating an equilibrium exchange rate is 
avoided.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the shares of major items in the value 
of production for rice and barley, respectively. A milling cost has 
been added to published production cost data, and land is assumed to 
be the recipient of the residual value of production at actual market 
prices after all other cost items have been accounted for. The latter 
derives from the usual neoclassical assumption for the agricultural 
sector of constant returns to scale and perfect competition and hence 
zero super-normal profits.
In calculating DRC coefficients the following items need to be 
identified:^
(1) Gross value of output at the actual domestic 
market price.
(2) Tradable inputs at actual market prices. In this 
study all inputs are assumed to be tradables 
because the original data lacks any estimates
of non-tradable inputs. 'Other charges' have 
been adjusted to include the milling fees because 
the original data are based on the production of 
unhulled grain. After this adjustment the costs 
of fertilizers, disease prevention, other 
materials, agricultural implements, irrigation, 
and other charges are summed.
1 This approach closely follows that by Akrasanee (1976) for Thailand.
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(3) Value added in actual prices is gross output (1) 
less tradable inputs (2).
(4) Factor costs other than capital at actual 
market prices. This is obtained by summing 
up the costs of labour and land services. To 
calculate the cost of land services The Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries of Korea has used 
the formula:
A t pA = L x r x —p 12
where L : market price of land per unit;
P
r : interest rate; and 
P : growing period of rice or barley 
(months).
In using this formula, r had been arbitrarily selected 
to be 10 per cent until 1973 and 5 per cent since 
1974. Apart from its arbitrariness, this approach 
begs the question of which factor receives the 
residual between the calculated cost of protection 
and the value of output. In this study the cost of 
land services has been taken as the residual after 
subtracting all costs of inputs and other factors 
from the value of output at actual market prices.
As mentioned above, this approach is based on the 
assumption of perfect competition in the farm sector.^
(5) Taxes and public charges.
1 Strictly speaking, this residual goes to management as well as land, 
but since most land is owner-occupied, the two factors are owned by 
the same people, namely the tillers, so the differentiation is 
unnecessary.
43
(6) Private profitability, which is actual value 
added minus factor costs other than capital 
minus taxes and public charges.
(7) Gross output at world market price which is the 
appropriate world price of the product (export 
price some years, proxy import price other 
years) times the official exchange rate.
(8) Tradable inputs at world market prices. The 
world prices of most inputs are assumed to be the 
same as domestic prices in the absence of data to 
the contrary. Exceptions are the price of seed 
which is converted into world prices by dividing 
by the nominal protection coefficient on output, 
and the prices of government-supplied fertilizers 
which are converted into world prices simply by 
assuming the domestic to world price ratios for 
all fertilizers are the same as that of urea, for 
which data are available.^
(9) Value added in world market prices which is simply 
the difference between the previous two items.
(10) Domestic resources costs for labour and land at 
opportunity costs. Because of the large 
contribution of land and family labour to rice and 
barley production in Korea, it is critical that the 
social opportunity costs of these inputs be accurately
1 This assumption is reasonable given that urea is the major inorganic 
fertilizer in both rice and barley production in Korea. In 1980, 
urea occupied 32 and 43 per cent of total inorganic fertilizer used 
in rice and barley production, respectively.
44
reflected in the cost structure of the systems 
evaluated. It has been assumed that family labour 
has a social opportunity cost equal to the average 
wage rate for hired labour. This assumption, 
which implies that the labour market is well 
developed and that it has no distortions, is 
reasonable since the practice of hiring labour in 
rice and barley production is common and the workers 
have alternative work opportunities through the 
whole period of rice and barley production in Korea.
The shortage of rural labour at peak seasons makes 
labour competition sharp within the rural sector.
In addition, easy access to information on other 
job opportunities, helped by a convenient 
transportation system, ensures that the labour market 
operates efficiently. The social opportunity cost 
of farm land is usually estimated either on the basis 
of rental rate of farm land or on the basis of 
alternative uses of farm land. Data on alternative 
uses of farm land which are common through the whole 
country are not available. In addition, tenancy is 
illegal in Korea, so details of rental rates are not 
published even though the practice continues.
Therefore, in this study the opportunity cost of farm 
land is obtained by deflating the residual calculated 
in (4) by the weighted average nominal protection 
coefficient (NPC) for all foodgrains in Korea.^
1 Estimates of this nominal protection coefficient over the period under 
study are available from Anderson (1981).
45
This is based on the assumption that the value 
of crop protection becomes capitalized into land 
values. (See Johnson, 1973, p.196 and Floyd, 1965.)
(11) Social profitability, which is simply the difference 
between the two previous items.
(12) Domestic capital costs at opportunity costs. The 
data on actual capital costs include the interest 
paid for capital, maintenance costs and depreciation 
on fixed capital. By assuming a competitive capital 
market, no adjustment is made to these to obtain 
social capital costs.
(13) Net social profitability at the official exchange 
rate is the difference between social profitability 
and domestic capital costs.
(14) Nominal protective coefficient on output (NPCO), 
which is the ratio of the domestic to world price of 
rice or barley.
(15) Nominal protective coefficient on tradable inputs 
(NPCI), which is the weighted average ratio of the 
domestic to world price of tradable inputs.
(16) Effective protective coefficient on value added, 
which is the ratio of the domestic to world price 
of value added.
(17) Domestic resource cost coefficient (DRC), which is 
the ratio of the domestic resource costs for factors 
of production to value added in world market prices.
Throughout this analysis the official exchange rate is assumed
to be an adequate approximation of the shadow price of foreign exchange.
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In fact, since the removal of rice and barley protection would cause 
trade to expand such liberalization would probably be accompanied by a 
devaluation of the Won. Thus the effective protection rates calculated 
at the official exchange rate will overstate somewhat the extent of 
protection of individual industries. However, given the difficulties 
in estimating the extent of overvaluation no more is done in this study 
other than to note this fact.
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CHAPTER 5
ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND 
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COSTS FOR RICE AND BARLEY, 
1964 TO 1980
5.1 Results for Rice
Private and social profitability, effective protection 
coefficients, and domestic resource cost coefficients are given for rice 
in Table 5.1.
Given the extensive involvement of the government in the Korean 
rice economy, it is of interest to delineate the mechanisms by which 
private incentives are created by the application of government policies. 
The nominal protection coefficients (NPC) represent the distortion to 
the incentive structure on the output or input side. The effective 
protection coefficient (EPC), which considers the input and output price 
distortions together, is a ratio of value added measured in domestic 
prices to that measured in world prices. During the period under study 
the EPC has been rising even faster than the NPC on output.
The results of the analysis reported in Table 5.1 illustrate 
that the extent of protection for rice production has been expanding 
since the late 1960s, with a temporary break around 1974 when world 
prices increased briefly to exceptionally high levels.
The domestic resource cost coefficients have been increasingly 
above 1 from the mid 1960s. By 1980, DRC estimates suggest each dollar 
of foreign exchange saved by producing rice domestically cost almost 
three dollars of foreign exchange foregone by not allowing those resources 
to be employed in industries with a stronger comparative advantage. The
48
TABLE 5.1
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST COEFFICIENTS FOR RICE 
(Korean Won Per Kilogram, or as Indicated)
Year
ts and Return 
a and Indicators
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Gross output at 
actual market 
prices 47.78 40.13 42.33 46.63 54.88 67.69 76.33 95.93 121.77 127.55 184.36 233.16 280.85 310.54 364.14 472.34 616.40
Tradable Inputs, 
at actual market 
prices 5.14 7.30 6.85 8.41 10.17 9.41 11.04 12.78 16.79 17.52 21.39 32.40 41.73 45.53 55.95 70.37 130.02
Value added, in 
actual prices 
[(l)-(2) ] 37.64 32.82 35.47 38.22 44.70 58.53 65.27 83.14 104.98 110.03 162.98 200.76 239.12 265.01 308.18 401.97 486.38
Factor costs, 
other than capital, 
at actual market 
prices 36.24 30.63 33.59 35.81 41.85 55.45 62.05 79.55 100.24 105.36 157.57 193.77 229.99 254.17 295.13 380.32 442.66
Taxes 0.71 0.82 0.91 0.85 0.88 1.07 0.85 0.92 1.53 1.10 1.19 2.16 3.33 4.39 4.78 7.25 1.82
Private 
profitability 
((3)-(4)-(5)] 6.89 1.37 9.78 1.56 1.96 2.01 2.39 2.67 3.22 3.57 4.21 4.83 5.81 6.45 8.27 14.40 25.48
Gross output, at 
world market 
prices 33.60 42.45 45.26 46.54 48.48 55.20 58.78 52.30 53.98 99.90 172.96 195.54 127.29 106.00 158.75 143.26 220.10
Tradable inputs, 
at world market 
prices 5.70 7.71 6.91 8.58 10.02 8.96 10.33 12.29 16.42 17.83 26.04 38.55 34.84 39.64 51.06 64.64 118.82
Value added in 
world market 
prices[(7)-(8)] 27.90 34.74 38.84 37.95 38.46 46.24 48.45 40.01 37.56 82.07 146.92 156.98 92.46 66.35 107.70 78.63 101.28
Domestic resource 
costs for labour 
and land, at 
opportunity costs 29.30 31.96 36.36 35.81 38.61 47.49 53.02 53.92 60.65 90.19 151.78 184.13 147.57 121.29 160.98 179.23 276.61
Social profita­
bility [(9)-(10)) -1.41 2.79 1.99 2.15 -0.15 -1.25 -4.56 -13.91 -23.09 -8.12 -4.86 -27.14 -55.12 -54.93 -53.29 -100.60 -175.33
.Domestic capital 
costs, at 
opportunity costs 0.69 1.37 0.98 1.56 1.96 2.01 2.39 2.67 3.22 3.57 4.21 4.83 5.81 6.45 8.27 14.40 25.48
.Net social 
profitability at 
official exchange 
rate((11)-(12)] -2.09 1.41 1.01 0.59 -2.12 -3.26 -6.96 -16.58 -26.31 -11.69 -9.07 -31.98 -60.92 -61.38 -61.55 -115.00 -200.81
.Nominal protective 
coefficient on 
output(NPCO) 
[(1)*(7)1 1.27 0.95 0.94 1.00 1.13 1.23 1.30 1.83 2.26 1.28 1.07 1.19 2.21 2.93 2.29 3.30 2.80
.Nominal protective 
coefficient on 
tradable inputs 
(NPCI)[(2)7 (8)) 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.98 1.02 1.05 1.07 1.04 1.02 0.98 0.82 0.84 1.20 1.15 1.10 1.09 1.09
.Effective protective 
coefficient on value 
added(EPC)
[(3)?(9)] 1.35 0.94 0.92 1.01 1.16 1.27 1.35 2.08 2.80 1.34 1.11 1.28 2.59 3.99 2.86 5.11 4.80
.Domestic resource 
cost coefficient 
(DRC)((10)+(12)] 
t (9) ] 1.075 0.959 0.974 0.985 1.055 1.070 1.144 1.414 1.700 1.143 1.062 1.204 1.659 1.925 1.572 2.463 2.983
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DRC coefficients for Korean rice production are extremely high by world 
standards, and are probably exceeded only in Japan. Table 5.2 shows 
that in 1974 it was already much higher than in the United States, 
Thailand and the Philippines. Since then this difference has probably 
increased, given the extremely rapid rise in Korea's effective rice 
protection since 1974.
TABLE 5.2
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF SOME INDICATORS 
FOR RICE PRODUCTION, 1974
Country
Indicators
Korea
(Average)
USA(California) 
Long Grain
Philippines
(Laguna)
Thailand 
(Chainat 
Modern Trans)
NPCO 1.07 1.00 1.17 0.52
NPCI 0.82 0.99 1.13 0.80
EPC 1.11 1.00 1.18 0.49
DRC 1.06 0.50 0.85 0.34
Source: Food Research Institute, 1976. Food Research Institute Studies,
Vol.XV, No.2, pp.259-67.
Table 5.3 helps explain the deterioration in Korea's comparative 
advantage in rice production. During the past 17 years, the yield per 
hectare and the border price have increased by 39 per cent (if 1980 is 
included it is only 3 per cent) and 149 per cent respectively, while the 
cost of farm land service, the producer price, and labour costs have 
increased substantially more: 276 per cent, 195 per cent, and 364 per
cent respectively. Since land and labour account for more than 80 per 
cent of total cost it is not difficult to understand why comparative 
advantage has been declining.
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TABLE 5.3 
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Rice “ | Barley General
Yield Producer Border Cost of Labour Yield Producer Border Cost of Labour Domestic Border Weighted Interest
sar Pries Price Land Cost Price Price Land Cost Price of Price of Average Rate
Service Service Urea Urea N.P.C for 
all Grain
kg/ha $/m /t $/m /t Won/a Won/a kg/a -C
O
H $/M/t Won/« Won/a $/m /t $/m /t
964 33.4 200 157 953 236 17.4 173 112 293 159 61 91 1.32 15.0
965 28.9 151 159 598 260 17.6 105 125 884 184 101 116 0.94 15.0
966 32.8 157 167 803 257 19.8 98 137 110 188 101 102 0.90 30.0
967 29.7 174 173 727 308 18.7 114 145 150 201 85 91 1.00 30.0
968 28.1 199 175 738 395 17.7 121 113 138 222 83 81 1.14 27.6
969 33.9 236 191 1343 481 20.7 135 104 255 287 89 78 1.25 25.2
970 33.0 245 189 1395 589 19.5 137 131 177 351 86 68 1.27 22.8
971 33.7 274 149 1936 663 19.6 168 101 363 436 73 71 1.80 22.8
972 33.4 309 137 2454 799 20.8 191 100 567 515 68 76 2.16 17.4
973 35.8 320 251 2705 957 19.2 193 166 339 608 75 83 1.25 12.6
974 37.1 454 426 4503 1217 17.7 240 257 366 704 80 184 1.05 15.0
975 38.6 482 404 5676 1663 21.6 282 297 1260 765 133 262 1.07 15.0
976 43.3 580 263 7900 1879 22.7 287 307 899 989 253 133 1.82 15.0
977 49.4 642 219 10227 2147 14.6 389 181 152 1048 253 150 2.78 16.2
978 47.4 752 328 11108 2655 21.1 443 186 1144 1520 253 177 2.33 14.4
979 45.3 976 296 13232 3707 29.7 512 210 2443 2428 253 178 3.18 18.1
980 28.9 1014 362 7953 4486 24.5 499 260 2172 2767 334 222 2.49 24.0
ncrease 
ate (X) 2.983 195.01 153.75 275.9 364.1 108.04 149.10 149.27 692.7 370.7 185.56 195.07 134.20 95.4
lurces: 1. Korea Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Report on the Results of Production Cost Survey of Agricultural Products, various
issues.
2. Anderson, 1981. 'Northeast Aslan Agricultural Protection In Historical and Comparative Perspective: The Case of South Korea', 
Auatralla-Japan Research Centre Research Paper No.82, A.N.U., Canberre.
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The estimates of the domestic resource cost coeffients for 
rice for different farm size groups are assembled in Table 5.4. There 
have been greater fluctuations in the DRC coefficients between years 
than between different farm size groups. During the 1960s they were 
stable around 1.0. In the 1970s they have increased in 
favour of larger farms. Figure 5.1 illustrates this
change diagramatically. There is a tendency for a consistent
relationship between farm size and DRC. Even though the differences 
between different farm size groups are not large the gap implies that 
the larger farm size is more efficient in earning or saving foreign 
exchange compared with smaller farm sizes. This result is in apparent 
contradiction to the general trend of Korean farmers who prefer small or 
medium size to large farms (Table 3.4).
Table 5.5 shows the sources of differences in comparative 
advantage between different farm size groups. It is clear from the 
last three rows that the larger group has had higher comparative advantage 
because of higher productivities of labour and capital, and even a slight 
advantage in land productivity.
To examine the sensitivity of the estimated DRC coefficients 
to changes in the costs of capital, fertilizer, labour, land, and yield, 
elasticities have been estimated. In the absence of data required for 
a linear programming approach, these elasticities are obtained by 
recalculating the DRC coefficients assuming a 10 per cent higher cost 
for each variable in turn. The elasticity is then defined as the 
proportional change in the cost of the variable under consideration 
divided by the proportional change in the DRC coefficients. The results 
of these calculations for recent years are shown in Table 5.6.
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FIGURE 5.1
CHANGING TREND OF DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST
COEFFICIENT FOR RICE BY FARM SIZE
Smaller than 0.5 ha
Larger than 2.0 ha
64 65
Years
0
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TABLE 5.5
COST OF RICE PRODUCTION AND PRODUCTIVITY
('a')BY FARM SIZE GROUP PER HECTARE v ' 
(Korean Won, or as Indicated)
Farm Size
Items
Smaller 
than 0.5 ha
0.5 - 
1.0 ha
1.0 - 
1.5 ha
1.5 - 
2.0 ha
Larger 
than 2.0 ha
Seed 667.7 6644 6496 6446 6312
Fertilizer 33463 31982 30266 30756 29814
Disease Prevention 14183 13258 12275 11972 11619
Other Materials 7350 7386 7382 7809 8007
Taxes 5148 6723 8922 11845 20773
Irrigation 11208 10796 11181 12677 14568
Agricultural Implement 25216 21139 19129 18538 18026
Building 5671 3694 2850 2674 2320
Other Charges 3252 2231 1889 1516 1781
Labour (1) 151450 140630 133190 130730 125790
Capital (2) 18817 16888 16232 16282 16421
Land (3) 412510 422980 435720 441050 457060
Price of Rice (4) 
Won/Kg 186.9 186.9 186.9 186.9 186.9
Yield: Kg/ha (5) 3602 3560 3577 3611 3637
Gross Output
(6) = (4) x (5) 673214 665364 668541 674896 679755
Labour Productivity 
(7) = (6) / (1) 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.4
Capital Productivity 
(8) = (6) / (2) 35.8 39.4 41.2 41.5 41.4
Land Productivity 
(9) = (6) / (3) 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5
(a) Average of 17 years from 1964 to 1980. 
Source: Calculated from Adjusted Data.
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TABLE 5.6
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST ELASTICITY FOR RICE 
WITH RESPECT TO MAJOR VARIABLES, 
1977-1980 (AVERAGE)
Farm Size Capital Fertilizer Labour Land Yield
Average 32.3 9.6 4.0 2.1 -1.4
Smaller than 
0.5 ha 30.0 7.4 3.6 2.3 -1.2
0.5 - 1.0 ha 34.0 8.5 3.8 2.2 -1.3
1.0 - 1.5 ha 30.8 9.3 3.9 2.1 -1.4
1.5 - 2.0 ha 32.7 9.5 4.0 2.0 -1.5
Larger than 
2.0 ha 33.4 10.5 4.1 1.9 -1.5
Examination of these elasticities reveals the importance of 
each variable in determining domestic resource costs. The DRC 
elasticities presented show the percentage change in that particular 
variable needed to produce one per cent change in the DRC coefficient. 
For each variable, the lower the elasticity value shown, the higher is 
the DRC elasticity with respect to that variable. Table 5.6 shows the 
results that DRC coefficients are most sensitive to the change in yield. 
A DRC elasticity for yield of -1.4 means that if the yield of rice had 
been 1.4 per cent higher in 1977-80 the DRC would have been one per cent 
lower. Sensitivity to changes in the cost of land services is next in 
importance and the importance decreases progressively for labour, 
fertilizer, capital. This implies that new land and labour saving
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technologies are necessary to reduce the rate of decline in the Korean 
rice industry's comparative advantage.
There are differences in sensitivity between different farm 
size groups. In general the smaller group is more sensitive to any 
changes in variables than larger groups, except for land. These 
differences are related with the differences of intensity of inputs and 
factor use between different farm size groups.
The critical sensitivity of the DRC coefficients to changes 
in the world rice price is apparent from examination of Figure 5.2. In 
1979, the largest farm size group would have had comparative advantage 
if the world rice price had been over US$518/ton. On the other hand, 
the world rice price would have had to increase at least up to US$550/ton 
to make the smallest farm size group have comparative advantage, ceteris 
paribus.^
5.2 Results for Barley
The same procedure has been applied for barley. There are 
some differences between rice and barley. Even though both of them have 
been the staple foodgrains in Korea historically, barley has always been 
considered by consumers to be inferior to rice. Also, the method of 
planting barley is different from that of rice. Rice is transplanted 
while barley is broadcast. Because of differences in cultivating 
practices the share of major inputs and factors in the value of barley 
production differ from those for rice, as is clear from a comparison of 
Table 4.1 and 4.2. The higher shares for labour, (38 per cent for barley 
compared with 21 per cent for rice), fertilizer (18 per cent versus 5 per
1 Because 1980 was a disasterous year for rice production in Korea, 1979 
is shown in Figure 5.2. The required world rice price of US$518/ton 
is 75 per cent higher than the actual price of that year, US$296/ton.
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FIGURE 5.2
SENSITIVITY OF THE DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST COEFFICIENTS 
OF RICE TO WORLD PRICE CHANGE IN 1979
a
Smaller than 0.5 ha
Larger than 2.0 ha
400
World(border) Price in US$/ton
a: actual price (1979)
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cent), agricultural implements (4.4 versus 1.9), and seed (3.6 versus 
1.0) are particularly noticeable. Labour cost is the most important 
variable in barley production while the cost of land services is 
considerably less important.
On upland, Korean farmers can grow various kinds of crops 
alternatively while for paddy land the alternatives are fairly limited. 
Therefore, Korean farmers are more responsive to changes in barley price 
compared with any changes in rice price.
The DRC coefficients estimates for barley are summarised in 
Table 5.7. As with rice production, negative net social profitability 
has been recorded in general.
The NPCO has increased suddenly above 2.0 since 1977 while 
NPCIs have been greater than unity since 1976. These results show that 
barley production has also faced distorted incentives for both output 
and inputs. Moreover, they illustrate that these distortions have 
increased in recent years.
The EPC and DRC have also shown the same general trend as that 
for rice. The DRC coefficients are much higher and fluctuate more in 
barley production compared with rice production. Barley production in 
Korea has clearly been very inefficient in saving foreign exchange. As 
shown in Figure 5.3 this efficiency has deteriorated in recent years.
Table 5.8 shows that there is no consistent trend in differences 
of DRC coefficients between different farm size groups. On average, the 
0.5 - 1.0 ha group shows the lowest DRC coefficient, 1.7, and the 1.5 - 
2.0 ha group shows the highest value, 1.9. However, as shown in 
Figure 5.3, curvatures of the DRC coefficients do not significantly differ 
from each other. Even the results of the sensitivity analysis do not 
show any characteristic difference between different farm size groups 
(Table 5.9).
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TABLE 5.7
EFFECTIVE PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST COEFFICIENTS FOR BARLEY 
(Korean Won Per Kilogram, or as Indicated)
Year
eta and Return 
ta and Indicators
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Gross output at 
actual market 
prices 36.98 27.88 26.48 30.61 33.52 38.88 42.39 58.82 75.19 76.95 97.26 136.41 138.86 188.71 214.63 247.65 303.58
Tradable inputs, 
at actual market 
prices 9.74 10.61 9.75 10.28 11.32 10.62 12.37 14.70 18.57 23.02 30.99 35.84 47.41 91.13 74.80 68.85 89.17
Value added, in 
actual prices 
[(l)-(2)] 27.24 17.27 16.73 20.33 22.20 28.26 30.03 44.12 56.62 53.94 66.27 100.56 91.45 97.58 139.82 178.80 214.41
Factor costs, other 
than capital, at 
actual market 
prices 26.56 16.30 15.78 19.53 21.32 27.33 28.77 42.82 54.11 51.46 63.41 96.84 87.05 88.78 132.68 170.78 209.35
Taxes 0.43 0.57 0.55 0.37 0.33 0.34 0.44 0.27 0.50 0.70 0.79 0.89 1.19 2.10 2.29 3.15 1.55
Private 
profitability 
[(3)-(4)-(5) 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.55 0.59 0.82 1.03 2.00 1.78 2.06 2.84 3.21 6.69 4.85 4.87 3.51
Gross output, at 
world market prices 23.97 33.38 37.13 39.01 31.30 30.06 40.74 35.45 39.40 66.07 104.34 143.75 148.59 87.60 90.02 101.64 158.08
Tradable inputs, at 
world market prices 10.27 11.34 10.19 10.85 11.14 9.89 11.46 13.89 18.03 23.21 41.28 44.09 40.36 73.81 63.53 60.28 78.61
Value added in 
world market prices 
[(7)-(8)] 13.70 22.03 26.93 28.16 20.16 20.17 29.28 21.57 21.37 42.85 63.06 99.66 108.23 137.95 26.50 41.36 79.47
•Domestic resource 
costs for labour 
’and land at 
opportunity costs 20.7 17.3 17.9 21.7 20.8 24.5 28.4 35.5 41.1 49.0 65.0 99.9 90.0 83.2 101.2 122.2 170.0
.Social 
profitability 
•{ (9)-(10)) -6.95 4.78 8.99 6.49 -0.64 -4.31 0.86 -13.89 -19.76 -6.17 -1.91 -0.25 18.20 -69.42 -74.74 -80.88 -90.48
.Domestic capital 
costs, at 
opportunity costs 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.55 0.59 0.82 1.03 2.00 1.78 2.06 2.84 3.21 6.69 4.85 4.87 3.51
.Net social 
profitability at 
official exchange 
rate [(11)-(12)] -7.21 4.38 8.59 6.06 -1.19 -4.90 0.04 -14.91 -21.76 -7.95 -3.97 -3.09 14.99 -76.11 -79.60 -85.75 -94.00
.Nominal protective 
coefficient on 
output(NPCO)
[ (1 ) t ( 7 ) ] 1.54 0.84 0.71 0.78 1.07 1.29 1.04 1.66 1.91 1.16 0.93 0.95 0.93 2.15 2.38 2.44 1.92
.Nominal protective 
coefficient on 
tradable Inputs 
(NPCI)[(2)t (8)] 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 1.02 1.07 1.08 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.75 0.81 1.17 1.23 1.18 1.14 1.13
.Effective protective 
coefficient on value 
added (EPC)
[(3)t (9)] 1.99 0.78 0.62 0.72 1.10 1.40 1.03 2.05 2.65 1.26 1.05 1.01 0.84 7.07 5.28 4.32 2.70
.Domestic resource 
cost coefficient 
(DRC)[(10)+(12)] 
t (9) ] 1.527 0.801 0.681 0.785 1.059 1.243 0.999 1.692 2.018 1.186 1.063 1.031 0.861 6.517 4.004 3.073 2.183
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FIGURE 5.3
CHANGING TREND OF DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST
COEFFICIENT FOR BARLEY BY FARM SIZE
Smaller than 0.5 ha
Larger than 2.0 ha
Years
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TABLE 5.9
DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST ELASTICITY FOR BARLEY 
WITH RESPECT TO MAJOR VARIABLES, 
1977-1980 (AVERAGE)
Farm Size Capital Land Labour Fertilizer Yield
Average 121.5 3.8 2.5 1.7 -0.7
Smaller than 
0.5 ha 65.4 5.2 2.5 1.6 -0.7
0.5 - 1.0 ha 121.0 5.3 2.6 1.8 -0.7
1.0 - 1.5 ha 133.8 4.8 2.0 1.6 -0.6
1.5 - 2.0 ha 150.3 6.5 2.6 1.6 -0.7
Larger than 
2.0 ha 214.9 4.5 2.5 2.0 -0.8
As with rice, the barley DRC coefficients are most sensitive 
to change in yield. However, quite differently from rice, the cost of 
fertilizer is next in importance. The higher importance of fertilizer 
in barley production compared with rice production is due to the 
relatively higher use of organic fertilizer in barley production.
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the relationship between DRC and world 
price of barley. According to this diagram the world price of barley 
would have had to be at least US$412/ton to make Korean barley production 
socially profitable in 1980. This is 58 per cent higher than the actual 
price of that year.
1 In 1980, the amounts of inorganic fertilizer used for rice and barley 
production were 486 kg and 406 kg per hectare, respectively but that 
of organic fertilizer were 2,840 kg and 5,940 kg respectively.
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FIGURE 5.4
SENSITIVITY OF THE DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST 
COEFFICIENTS OF BARLEY TO WORLD PRICE 
CHANGE IN 1980
a
Smaller than 0.5 ha
Larger than 2.0 ha
World(border) Price in US$/ton
a: actual price (1980)
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5.3 Summary of Results
In summarising the results of this chapter the following 
points are worth repeating. Mostly negative net social profitability 
has been recorded for rice and barley production in Korea. During the 
past two decades, DRCs for both rice and barley indicate that these 
industries have over time become increasingly more inefficient in 
saving foreign exchange. This has been possible because agricultural 
protection has been increasing rapidly over the past 15 years.
Differences between the various farm size groups are not substantial. 
However, in rice production, the larger the farm size the less comparative 
disadvantage exists. This difference is mainly due to the differences 
of productivities of labour and capital. DRC is most sensitive to change 
in yield. Cost of land services and labour are next in importance in 
rice production. 'In barley production DRC is more sensitive to change 
in the cost of fertilizer than labour or land.
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CHAPTER 6
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
6.1 Problems with Current Agricultural Price and Trade Policies in Korea
The Korean government has attempted to influence the prices 
paid and received by farmers since the late 1940s. Sales of chemicals, 
fertilizers, and farm machinery have been subsidized in various ways in 
order to stimulate their greater use. In the meantime, grain prices, 
specially rice and barley prices, have been supported by restricting 
imports and by introducing a wedge between consumer and producer prices. 
This has resulted in numerous problems, two of which are mentioned here, 
namely the effects on the government budget and on net social welfare.
Under a single-price system, if the government attempts to 
increase production and reduce consumption of rice in order to keep the 
aggregate demand and supply of rice in balance without imports, both the 
purchase and selling prices must be relatively higher than free market 
prices. This high price of rice contributes to increasing farm revenue 
as well as to reducing rice consumption. High prices of rice, however, 
have an adverse effect on urban consumer welfare. The adoption of a 
two-price system for rice and barley, in which the price for farmers 
exceeds the price for consumers, has been one means of resolving this 
dilemma and attaining simultaneously some conflicting objectives. The 
two-price system was put into effect in 1969 in Korea. Since then the 
two-price policy involving a price subsidy for rice and barley producers 
has increased grain production and at the same time reduced grain 
consumption less than would have been the case without producer price 
supports. But the two-price policy has caused government costs of grain
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management to increase at an accelerating pace. Table 6.1 reveals the 
magnitude of the deficit in the grain account and its increasing trend.
TABLE 6.1
DEFICIT OF GRAIN ACCOUNT
’000 Million Won
Source
Year Rice Barley
Other
Grains
Wheat
Flour Total
1970-75 377 798 50 1265 2490
-76 197 286 5 15 503
-77 219 433 21 - 631
-78 1540 145 94 - 1591
-79 1851 285 49 - 2087
-80 1400 1068 51 - 2417
Total 5584 3015 160 1280 9179
Source: Korea Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Annual Report on
Agricultural Trend, p.134, 1981.
In an effort to alleviate the burden of this increasing deficit, the 
government has slowed the rate of increase in the purchasing price since 
1975 or even decreased it in real terms.^ Nevertheless, the amount of 
the deficit was 2,417 billion Won in 1980. A large portion of this 
deficit has been financed through a long term overdraft from the central 
bank. This has been a controversial issue because of its effect on the 
money supply. On the other hand, supporting higher prices or giving 
subsidies are related to output or size of farm and result in widening 
income differentials within agriculture (Johnson, 1973). In short, the
1 For more detailed discussion of this see Moon, 1980. ’Agricultural 
Price Policy’, in Modernization of Korean Agriculture, (eds), Kim, M.S. 
et al, Korea Rural Economics Institute.
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price support policy for grains in Korea has resulted not only in 
considerable distortions of market prices but it has also caused a large 
budget deficit and income differential.
If free trade had operated in the 1970s, although the trend of 
foodgrain imports would have been in the same direction the magnitude 
would have been larger. Anderson (1981) estimates that there was about 
1.6 per cent of GNP equivalent net loss to the Korean economy in the 
late 1970s because of foregoing the opportunity to take advantage of the 
gains from international trade in grains and livestock production.^ In 
addition to the huge cost of high protection there are also large adverse 
income and wealth distribution effects from current trade policies.
6.2 Some Alternative Policies
Upgrading farm incomes and maintaining food security have been 
the food policy makers' main concern in Korea. However, given the 
changing role of agriculture in Korea's open economy, the goal of 
increasing Korea's international competitiveness in manufactures has also 
been important.
To achieve those two goals, efforts have been concentrated on
increasingly supporting producer prices with an ultimate goal of
achieving foodgrain self sufficiency. The resulting upward trend in
Korea's agricultural protection is not dissimilar to that occuring in
2many rapidly industrialising countries. However, the limitations of 
price support have already been recognised through the experiences of
1 It is a rough estimate based on crude partial equilibrium analysis.
The estimated loss could be much greater than this if a more thorough 
analysis were to be done.
2 Johnson (1973) reports that total cost of agricultural protection, 
including both the cost of higher consumer prices and the burden of 
government disbursements, was equivalent to 55 per cent of agriculture's 
gross domestic product in the EEC countries and 38 per cent in the US
in the late 1960s. Hemmi (1978) has calculated the figure for Japan 
during the same period as 51 per cent.
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OECD countries. The price support for farm products has resulted in 
overproduction and budgetary problems rather than achieving the goal of 
upgrading farm incomes. On the other hand it has become increasingly 
apparent that income targets for the farm community can not be achieved 
without structural adjustment, involving in particular a reduction in 
the number of farms and an increase in their average size. OECD (1972) 
reports that changes in this direction have been occurring already in 
almost all OECD countries. Korea is no exception. Alternative policy 
instruments are available for achieving the main policy goals at lower 
cost than those currently in use. In particular, those policies would 
aim at facilitating structural adjustment. First, encouraging larger 
scale of operation would be helpful. Comparative advantage in grain 
production can not be expected to increase while the average farm size 
remains around 1.0 hectare. One way to facilitate an increase in farm 
size would be to raise the 3 hectare legal ceiling on land ownership 
(Oh, 1980). Another would be to provide concessional finance for the 
purpose of reducing the current extent of fragmentation of plots.
The previewed necessity of increasing food self sufficiency for 
food security reasons has tended to be emphasised increasingly in a 
number of food-deficit, highly-industrialised economies as their incomes 
rise (Hayami, 1980). However, product self sufficiency is a poor index 
of independence from world markets in a situation where the crucial 
inputs (fertilizer, feedgrains) have to be imported. In addition, food 
security through import dependence can be enhanced through 
diversification of import sources and through adopting a stockpiling 
program. This is not to say of course that there may not be high returns 
from investing in more agricultural research and rural infrastructure in 
Korea. It may also be possible to boost farm household incomes efficiently.
69
6.3 Lessons for Other Developing Countries
Korean agricultural policy has put emphasis on protecting 
domestic agricultural production to achieve higher self sufficiency, 
resulting in distortions of prices and resources allocation as well as 
high loss of social welfare. Despite the rapid development of the 
national economy, the agricultural sector has lagged far behind in 
productivity growth and its contribution to GNP. Moreover, the 
situation is getting worse, judged by the DRC estimates presented above.
The vicious circle of comparative advantage and higher protection has 
become a chronic dilemma of agricultural policy of Korea. Once involved 
in this type of dilemma it is difficult to reverse the situation, because 
the value of protection becomes capitalized into the value of land 
(Johnson, 1973). Both Korea's and Japan's experiences are a sobering 
lesson for other developing countries. Japan's domestic rice price 
relative to the international price of rice has been increasing steadily for 
decades and is currently about four times world prices (Saxon and 
Anderson, 1982). Even though the rice price of Korea is not yet as 
high as that in Japan the difference between them is declining steadily.
Ever-increasing protection and price supports become too 
costly to the national economy to continue forever. Structural 
adjustment policies supported by supplementary instruments can prevent 
a country from indulging deeply in this dilemma. By using criteria such 
as DRC it is possible to regularly check this situation, which would be 
helpful in making decisions on required structural adjustment. In particular 
the knowledge of DRC elasticities with respect to various components and 
yield can assist evaluation of development programs. In addition, the 
critical minimum world price of a product can be assessed frequently so 
as to know the range of prices within which a country would continue to 
have comparative advantage.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Korea's record of economic growth and rapid industrialisation 
since the mid 1960s is well known. Korea has transformed into an 
industrialised country from an agricultural country during the past two 
decades. In the process of becoming more industrialised the Korean 
economy has become increasingly more open to international trade. 
Comparative advantage in rice and barley production has been declining 
continuously over this period. At the same time it has sought to achieve 
self sufficiency in the major foodgrains. Theory suggests that a densely 
populated country with little arable land is likely to lose comparative 
advantage in agricultural production when economic growth occurs.
It is observed that there has been increasing comparative 
disadvantage in rice and barley production during the past 17 years.
The situation has been worst for barley production and it has been 
deteriorating especially rapidly for both rice and barley in recent years. 
This deterioration is mainly due to a rapid increase in the cost of labour 
and land. The smallest farm size group has shown slightly higher DRCs 
than largest farm size groups in rice production. However, in barley 
production there has been little difference between the various farm size 
groups. DRC is most sensitive to change in yield for both rice and
barley. The cost of land and labour are next in importance for rice
while costs of fertilizer and labour are more important for barley. For 
Korea's rice production to have been competitive internationally in 1979 
the world price of rice would have had to be US$518 or 75 per cent above 
the actual world price that year. Similarly, barley production could
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have been competitive in 1980 only if the world price had been around 
US$412, 58 per cent higher price than the actual price.
To increase comparative advantage of rice and barley production 
in Korea, it is necessary for there to be substantial structural 
adjustments.
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APPENDIX
DEFINITION AND METHODS OF CALCULATING 
COST OF PRODUCTION ITEM FOR RICE AND BARLEY1
1. Cost of Seeds and Seedlings
For self-supplied or free seeds or seedlings, the farm gate 
price at the time of sowing is used for evaluation while for purchased 
seeds additional marketing costs are added to the purchasing price.
2. Costs of Fertilizer
To calculate the cost of inorganic fertilizer, purchasing 
costs are added to the market price and for the portion which is given 
free the present farm gate price is applied. For the portion purchased 
before the survey, the price at the time it is used is applied.
Purchased organic fertilizer is evaluated just like the purchased 
inorganic fertilizer. Self-supplied organic fertilizer is evaluated 
by applying the market price.
3. Costs of Disease Prevention
This item covers all costs or charges related to prevention 
or cure of disease or any damage due to weather. For the purchased 
portion, costs charged for purchasing are added to the market price paid, 
while for the self-supplied portion the present farm gate price is 
applied. (Herbicides are included in the costs of other materials.)
4. Costs of Other Materials
Costs of all materials which contribute to the production of
1 This is mainly a direct translation from the Korea Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries’ Report on the Results of Production Cost 
Survey of Agricultural Products. 1981.
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rice directly or indirectly except seeds, fertilizers, and disease 
preventives are included in this item. For materials which have no 
market price, a certain price is imputed from the cost of raw material 
and the labour cost which were used to produce ’other materials’.
5. Costs of Irrigation
This item includes costs such as irrigation fees, cost of 
maintenance and depreciation of irrigation structures, and any other 
costs paid for irrigation. If any material is given to neighbours as 
a token of gratitude for allowing to irrigate from their water lines 
this also is included in the costs of evaluating the price of the gift.
6. Taxes
Taxes as well as any public charges which are paid by the farm 
households are included in this item. The portion which is attributable 
to rice or barley is calculated in proportion to the ratio of receipts 
of the surveyed crop to the total gross agricultural receipts of the 
farm households.
7. Other Charges
Milling costs and all miscellaneous charges other than 'taxes' 
are included in this item. The method of calculation is the same as 
'taxes'.
8. Costs of Agricultural Implements
After calculating the cost of maintenance and the amount of 
depreciation, the proportion which is attributable to rice (barley) is
estimated.
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9. Costs of Agricultural Buildings
This item includes all expenses on maintenance of the 
agricultural buildings and depreciation amounts except the stall and 
houses for heaping manure. From this the proportion attributable to 
rice (barley) is estimated.
10. Costs of Animal Labour
This item covers the costs of horse or draft cattle used for 
their power by adding the cost of fodder given during the work to the 
cost estimated by ordinary rent.
11. Costs of Labour
For the day labour costs, costs of food and costs of other 
materials like cigarettes are added to the money wage paid. For self- 
supplied labour or annual workers, only costs of food are added to the 
wage.
12. Costs of Land Services
This is calculated as the opportunity cost of interest foregone 
on capital investment in land. For owned land it is estimated in 
nominal terms at 5 per cent from 1974 and 10 per cent prior to 1974 of 
the market price of land assessed at the beginning of the survey period.
13. Costs of Capital Services
This item includes all expenses attributable to the use of any 
capital, fixed, working or wage fund. For fixed capital, the cost is 
that proportion of the year it is used for rice (barley) production times 
the total annual cost. As an annual interest rate, 12 per cent is
applied.
